Digital signatures provide guarantees on the authenticity and transferability of a message. This important cryptographic functionality is frequently used in modern communication systems. The security of currently used classical digital signature schemes, however, relies on computational assumptions, and thus they may not constitute a satisfactory long-term solution. In contrast, quantum digital signature (QDS) schemes offer information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. This is appealing, provided feasible schemes can be found. Here, we present two different quantum digital signature protocols which essentially use the same experimental requirements as quantum key distribution (QKD), which is already commercially available. This enables existing systems for QKD to be used also for digital signatures, which significantly extends and enhances the use of QKD systems. The first scheme is an improvement on a recent QDS scheme, removing the requirement of an optical multiport, which was a major source of losses. The second protocol is essentially a classical digital signature protocol, which employs quantum key distribution for obtaining secret shared classical keys. Relying on the security of QKD, this results in an information-theoretically secure digital signature scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures is a cryptographic functionality commonly used to guarantee the identity of a sender, and the integrity of a message. Moreover, the message is transferable, i.e. if the message is forwarded, it is guaranteed that the new recipient will also accept the message as valid. This is different from ensuring that a message is secret, but no less important. Currently used classical digital signature schemes rely on public key encryption techniques, where conjectured but unproven computational hardness of cryptographic functions is used to ensure security. In contrast, quantum digital signature schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] , which are based on a quantum version of the one-time digital signature scheme by Lamport [6] , offer information-theoretic security relying on the laws of quantum mechanics.
In general communication settings there may be many parties involved, but here we will mainly consider the simplest non-trivial case for digital signatures, with three parties. It is not difficult, at least in principle, to generalise to more parties. Alice is the person who signs the message, Bob the person who first receives the message and needs to authenticate it, and Charlie the person who receives a forwarded message, and who verifies that the initial source was indeed Alice (Bob forwards the message Alice signed to Charlie). The desired protocol needs to be secure against malevolent behavior, provided that at most one of these three directly involved parties is malevolent. We require security both against message forging and against repudiation, when a message is accepted by one party but rejected when forwarded to another. In QDS, it is easier to forge a message when claiming it to be forwarded, and in forging scenarios we therefore assume that Bob is trying to forge a forwarded message to Charlie. In a more general setting with more parties involved, the number of honest parties required depends on the number of parties involved in signing and forwarding a given message. If the message is signed and then forwarded only once, this reduces to a three-party protocol.
QDS schemes have two stages, the distribution stage and the messaging stage. In the latter stage, a message is actually sent and signed. While details vary for different schemes, they share common features. During the distribution stage Alice sends a quantum signature, a sequence of quantum states, to all other participants. Bob and Charlie, in order to be safe from repudiation, can either perform some type of non-demolition comparison of their states [1] or symmetrisation of their states [2] [3] [4] [5] . Bob and Charlie then either store the quantum signature, or they measure it and store the outcomes. In the messaging stage, which could occur much later, Alice wants to sign a message. During the messaging stage, Alice sends the classical description of the quantum signature, and Bob and Charlie should confirm that this is compatible with their stored information.
The first QDS protocol, proposed by Gottesman and Chuang [1] , required involved processing of the quantum signatures -a general SWAP test and long-term quantum memory -which is currently unfeasible experimentally. In [2] , an optical multiport, which requires only linear optics, replaced the SWAP test. Long-term quantum memory was however still required. To remove this need, we suggested a protocol [4] in which the signature states are measured directly at the end of the distribution stage. This protocol guaranteed security, but still employed a multiport for security against repudiation.
An implementation of this scheme [5] , however, revealed that the multiport caused substantial losses and made increasing the distance between Bob and Charlie difficult in practice. It is therefore desirable to devise schemes which do not require a multiport. In this paper we propose such protocols for quantum digital signatures. They require only the same components as quantum key distribution (QKD), enabling existing QKD "hardware" to be used also for QDS.
We present two protocols for QDS, denoted P1 and P2. Neither of them requires quantum memory, nor a multiport. There are many possible variations on these protocols, e.g. using different possible quantum states for the quantum signatures (such as phase-encoded coherent states) or different types of measurements (such as unambiguous quantum state discrimination, minimum-error measurements, etc.). We will present versions that lead to a more straightforward security analysis, keeping in mind that for particular variations, one would make slight modifications in the analysis.
P1 is inspired by the protocol in [4, 5] , while P2 has even fewer requirements, since one only uses quantummechanical features in order to produce secret shared classical keys using QKD. After generating shared secret keys, P2 continues with a classical scheme realizing the desired guarantees with information-theoretic security, relying on the security of the shared secret keys. This means that the functionality of information-theoretically secure digital signatures can be obtained from point-to-point QKD. To our knowledge, no information-theoretically secure classical digital signature scheme based on secret shared keys between parties has been suggested before. It is interesting to note that the functionality of digital signatures is implied by that of sharing secret keys. This does not, however, imply that generating shared keys using QKD is the most efficient way of achieving quantum digital signatures.
QDS schemes typically make a few assumptions. Just as for QKD, it is assumed that between all parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, there exist authenticated classical channels. Such channels are resource-inexpensive and guarantee that classical messages cannot be tampered with. Moreover, for both QKD and QDS it is essential that the participants can be sufficiently sure that if a quantum state is sent to one or more recipients then (approximately) that same quantum state is also received, without an eavesdropper or forger having learnt (too much) about it. How to achieve this is well established for QKD, and we will comment on how to achieve this also for QDS in the discussion at the end. However, for the moment, when discussing P1, we will make the stronger assumption (which existing QDS protocols also have made) that there are authenticated quantum channels between the participants. This guarantees that the quantum state any participant sends is also the one that the intended recipient receives. Dishonest behavior is therefore limited to what quantum states a particular malevolent participant sends in the distribution stage, and what classical declaration they make in the messaging stage.
II. PROTOCOL P1
The main difference between P1 and the protocols in [4, 5] is that a multiport is not needed. Instead, security against repudiation is guaranteed by Bob and Charlie exchanging some of their signature elements. This leads to a significantly simpler experimental implementation. In the basic version of P1, the exchange is done before measuring the signature states, and in a modified version P1', described in the Appendix A, after measuring them. For simplicity, we will use the same four quantum states as the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution [7] . The BB84 states are given by
As discussed above, we assume that between all parties, Alice, Bob and Charlie, there exist authenticated classical and quantum channels. 2. Alice sends one copy of QuantSig k to Bob and one to Charlie, for each possible message k = 0 and k = 1.
3. Bob (Charlie), for each element l of his sequences QuantSig k for k = 0, 1, randomly chooses (e.g. by tossing a coin) to either forward the signature element to Charlie (Bob), or keep it and directly measures it as described under 4. below. In either case, a record of the position l is kept.
4. Bob (Charlie) measures the states he kept and the states that Charlie (Bob) sent him, randomly choosing either the {|0 , |1 } basis or the {|− , |+ } basis. In this way, for each signature element Bob or Charlie measures, each of them unambiguously excludes one of the four possible states. For example, if Bob obtains the measurement result "|1 ", this allows him to deduce that Alice cannot have sent the state |0 . Bob and Charlie record what state they excluded, for each element l and message k. This type of quantum measurement, which rules out some states, is called quantum state elimination [5, 8, 9] . The sequence of excluded states will later be used to authenticate or verify a message. We call this an eliminated signature.
If either Bob or
Charlie receives fewer than L(1/2 − r) or more than L(1/2 + r) signature elements per possible message from the other party, then the protocol is aborted. That is, in the ideal case with no transmission losses 1 , Bob expects on average L/2 signature elements from Charlie, and aborts if he receives too few or too many by setting a threshold r. Note that if all participants are honest, then the probability for abort depends on the coin that Bob (Charlie) tosses to decide whether to keep or forward a qubit. Since the choice is done independently, with equal probabilities for each instance, it follows that this probability decays exponentially as L increases.
At this point in the protocol, for some positions l in the quantum signature, Bob (Charlie) has measured both copies of signature elements which Alice sent, for some he has measured the signature element copy sent to him, for some the signature element copy sent to Charlie (Bob), and for some positions he has measured no signature element copy at all. Each of these possibilities occurs for on average L/4 positions l. This means that Bob, for each signature element position, has ruled out one, two or none of the four possible states that Alice could have sent, and similarly for Charlie. These records form Bob's and Charlie's eliminated signatures.
Messaging stage
1. To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends (m, P rivKey m ) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
2. Bob checks whether (m, P rivKey m ) matches his stored eliminated signature by counting how many elements of Alice's private key he actually ruled out in the distribution stage. If the mismatches are fewer than s a L, where s a is a small authentication threshold (zero in the ideal case), Bob accepts the message.
3. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to Charlie the pair (m, P rivKey m ) he received from Alice.
4. Charlie tests for mismatches similarly to Bob, but in order to protect against repudiation by Alice, he uses a different threshold. Charlie accepts the forwarded message if the number of mismatches is below s v L where s v is the verification threshold, with 0 ≤ s a < s v < 1.
Security analysis. Digital signature schemes should be secure against two types of attacks: repudiation and forging. Security against repudiation guarantees that Alice cannot make Bob and Charlie disagree on the validity (and consequently the content) of her message (except with very small probability). Security against forging means that any recipient will with high probability reject any message which was not sent by Alice herself. The security analysis will be outlined below, with more details given in Appendix A.
Security against repudiation: Alice initially sends (possibly different) strings of BB84 states to Bob and Charlie. More generally, she could send any possibly entangled states. Bob and Charlie randomly choose to keep or forward each of the signature elements. From Alice's perspective, Bob and Charlie therefore have identical quantum states at the end of the distribution stage, irrespective of what states she sent them. Intuitively, it is therefore impossible for her to make Bob accept and Charlie reject the same declaration. This claim is more rigorously examined in Appendix A. Moreover, Alice gains nothing by sending different quantum signatures to Bob and Charlie. Her best strategy to repudiate is to send a declaration with L(s v − s a )/2 mistakes compared to the quantum signature she sent. In that case the probability for repudiation is
which, with s a < s v , decays exponentially as the length L of the signature increases. Security against forging: In order to successfully forge, Bob needs to guess, causing fewer than Ls v mismatches, the part of the signature that Alice sent to Charlie and which Charlie kept. In so-called collective forging attacks, Bob makes measurements on individual signature elements. Bob, in order to make the best possible guess, should then perform minimum-error measurements on his elements. One can show [10] and Appendix A that for each element, the minimum probability for Bob to declare a mismatch is 1/8, leading to a bound on the forging probability
where K = (L − r)/2 is the number of elements that Charlie kept. This probability decays exponentially with the length L of the signature provided that s v < 1/8. Intuitively a similar analysis should be possible for coherent forging attacks, where Bob can make measurements on groups of signature elements, in an entangled basis. A rigorous analysis of this is however left for future work.
III. PROTOCOL P2
The second protocol, P2, achieves the functionality of QDS by using only (long) shared keys and untrusted classical channels. Shared keys can, of course, be achieved using a secure classical channel. Alternatively, QKD can be used for the generation of the shared keys, with information-theoretic security. If QKD is thought of as key expansion, this requires only short pre-shared keys, effectively independent of future message size.
For QKD, we also have to assume that untrusted quantum channels are available. In short, the protocol we present may be based on point-to-point QKD, which is under development in many research groups and even commercially available [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Distribution stage 
Messaging stage
1. To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends (m, P rivKeyB m , P rivKeyC m ) to the desired recipient (say Bob). That is, Alice declares both private keys corresponding to the message m in order to sign.
2. Bob checks whether the declaration (m, P rivKeyB m , P rivKeyC m ) matches his key and the parts of the key that Charlie sent him. If it does he accepts the message. Since the keys are classical we can assume that if all parties are honest there are no mismatches, and therefore we can set s a = 0.
3. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to Charlie the declaration (m, P rivKeyB m , P rivKeyC m ) he received from Alice. Charlie tests for mismatches similarly to Bob, but accepts the forwarded message if the following two conditions are met. (i) There is no mismatch between the declaration and the part of P rivKeyB m which Charlie obtained from Bob and (ii) there are fewer than s v L mismatches between the declaration and Charlie's P rivKeyC m , where the verification threshold required for security against repudiation satisfies 1/2 > s v > 0.
Security against repudiation: Alice needs to make Bob accept the message while Charlie rejects. This means that Alice's declaration cannot have any mismatch with Bob's key, and necessarily at least s v L mismatches with Charlie's key. The probability for repudiation then satisfies
where the RHS decays exponentially with increasing signature length L (more details in Appendix A). Security against forging: Bob needs to guess, with fewer than Ls v mistakes, the K ≥ L(1/2 − r) elements of Charlie's key that he did not receive (i.e. provided no abort occurred). The probability for each correct guess is 1/2, and the forging probability therefore satisfies
Provided that s v < 1/4 − r/2, this decays exponentially with increasing L (more details in Appendix A).
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have proposed and examined QDS schemes that can be implemented with current technology, in particular, with the same requirements as for QKD systems. In previous schemes [4, 5] , while the very demanding requirement for quantum memory was removed, repudiation was guaranteed by the use of a multiport. The multiport leads to high losses and greater experimental complexity, putting strict constraints on the distance by which the parties, especially Bob and Charlie, can be separated. In order to have a truly feasible QDS scheme we here suggested two (main) QDS protocols that do not require a multiport. Protocol P1, other than the multiport, requires similar resources as the protocols in [4, 5] . In protocol P2, QKD is used to obtain classical secret keys shared pairwise between all parties. This enables an "almost classical" digital signature scheme that gives information-theoretic security, relying on the security of QKD. This, to our knowledge, is the first information-theoretically secure classical digital signature scheme using secret shared keys between parties. This therefore also illuminates the connection between the functionality of digital signatures with that of sharing secret keys.
We now return to the question of how to ensure that the recipients receive the quantum states Alice is sending, without an adversary learning about or tampering with the states. This is relevant for protocol P1. Otherwise, Bob could forge by intercepting the signature states Alice sends to Charlie, and sending Charlie another sequence of states instead. This sequence could trivially be guaranteed to match a declaration Bob makes later on, when either pretending to send a message as Alice, or pretending to forward a message from Alice. We also require that Alice cannot tamper with the states that Bob forwards to Charlie and vice versa.
A quantum authenticated channel guarantees that if one sends a quantum state |ψ , then the same quantum state |ψ will be received. More precisely, that any unwanted perturbation of the sent state will be detected by the recipient. A quantum authenticated channel is at least as expensive as having a secure quantum channel, since, intuitively, it is impossible to overhear without tampering [16] . However, in QDS as in QKD we require a somewhat weaker notion than the full quantum authenticated channel.
For QKD it is necessary that Alice's and Bob's bits have a certain amount of classical correlations. In order to determine how correlated Alice's and Bob's bits are, they sacrifice random parts of the key by "announcing and comparing" some bit values. Based on the level of correlations in the announced bits, they can deduce that the correlations in the remaining bits are similar, using the quantum de Finetti theorem [17, 18] . This phase of a QKD protocol is known as Parameter Estimation (PE). If the required level of correlations is not achieved, the protocol is aborted. If sufficient correlations are present, Alice and Bob can distill a shared secret key using further classical postprocessing, namely Information Reconciliation (IR) and Privacy Amplification (PA). Tampering by a malevolent party reduces the key rate but does not render the protocol useless provided that the correlations are stronger than the required threshold.
In QDS protocols, we can most likely relax the requirement of quantum authenticated channels in a similar way. In particular, Alice and Bob (and similarly Alice and Charlie, and Bob and Charlie) can sacrifice parts of the signature and declare what states were sent and what measurement outcomes were obtained, in order to establish what classical correlations they share. This is analogous to the PE phase in QKD. If the correlations are below a certain threshold they abort, otherwise they proceed. The level of correlations will now be related to the length L needed for a given security level, analogous to how for QKD, it determines the key rate. Since a quantum digital signature protocol does not require that participants have identical signatures (and in fact relies on some participants having imperfect knowledge), there is no need for further postprocessing, corresponding to IR and PA in QKD. Although it seems clear that the procedure we have outlined should work, we leave a full rigorous investigation of this for future work.
There
In particular, security of the protocol P1 against coherent forging attacks is needed, and so is a full composable security analysis for both protocols. Entanglement-based protocols and device-independent QDS are two other open directions. Finally, important is to examine how these protocols and the resources required scale as we consider more than three parties involved.
a. Security against repudiation
During the distribution stage, Alice sends L qubits to Bob and L qubits to Charlie for each possible message. To specify which qubit we refer to, we say that qubit i m is the m th qubit sent to Bob, while j n the n th qubit sent to Charlie. Note that during the distribution stage Bob and Charlie exchange qubits, and that the labels above refer to which person Alice initially sent the qubit to.
At the end of the distribution stage, Bob and Charlie have measured all the 2L qubits using USE measurements. Since we assume that there is an authenticated quantum channel between Bob and Charlie, Alice cannot tamper with the states forwarded from Bob to Charlie and vice versa. From her point of view, each qubit is equally likely to end up being measured by either Bob or Charlie. For each of the 2L qubits, either Bob or Charlie has ruled out one possible state (out of four BB84 states). If Alice tries to repudiate a message, she sends a declaration which she wants Bob to accept and Charlie to reject. For each qubit the declaration either is compatible (a match, which we denote as 1), or is not compatible (a mismatch, which we denote as 0) with the classically stored information of what states have been ruled out. We therefore have a sequence of binary outcomes r = (b i1 , · · · , b iL , b j1 , · · · , b jL ) where b takes values {0, 1} and the subscript denotes the position and party to which the qubit was initially sent. There are 2 2L different sequences r but not all of them can be achieved by Alice (e.g. if the state ruled out for i m and j m is different, it is not possible that both b im and b jm give a mismatch).
For any fixed sequence of outcomes r, there is some probability p rep (r) that Alice repudiates. By sending the quantum signature ρ ij to Bob and Charlie, Alice generates a probability distribution on different outcomes r. We will denote the probability of getting outcome r if Alice sends the overall state ρ ij as p ρij (r). It follows that the overall repudiation probability given that Alice sends a total state ρ ij is
We can see that the probability of repudiation is bounded by max r p rep (r). In what follows, we show that this decays exponentially as the length of the signature L increases. Now we separately consider the subset initially sent to Bob and the subset initially sent to Charlie. Letp 
After randomly exchanging subsystems, the expected number of mismatches for both Bob and Charlie per signature element is the same and is given by
We can now see using the Hoeffding inequality [19] , that if p B ′ 0 > s a , the probability of Bob accepting is bounded by
and the probability of Charlie rejecting, provided that p < s v , is
We note that
It follows that the optimum choice for Alice to maximize the probability for repudiation is to have p = (s a + s v )/2, leading to the best repudiation probability
which, given that s a < s v , decays exponentially as the length L of the signature increases.
b. Security against forging
In order to succeed in forging, Bob needs to correctly guess the part of the signature that Alice sent to Charlie and which Charlie kept. More specifically, he has to avoid mismatches with Charlie's classical signature for these signature elements. Taking the worst-case scenario, we assume that Bob knows which bits Charlie keeps, before Bob forwards any signature elements to Charlie. In this case, then for all the elements which Charlie does not keep, Bob can, instead of forwarding the quantum signature element that Alice sent him, send to Charlie a state that will certainly match the declaration that Bob will make later on. Therefore, Bob to succeed in forging he must make fewer than s v L mistakes for the (on average) L/2 elements that Charlie received directly from Alice and did not forward to Bob. Taking again the worst case scenario, we assume that Charlie kept the fewest possible elements, K = L(1/2 − r), where r is the abort threshold. Bob can use his own copies of these K elements to make his best guess of a declaration that will be accepted by Charlie, and he is free to perform any measurement that will maximize his probability of forging not being detected. The probability for a mismatch not occurring for a given element is given by the minimum cost of a minimum-cost quantum measurement [20] and for now, we assume that this is C min . Therefore, Bob's expected probability for causing a mismatch is C min , and using the Hoeffding inequalities [19] for the K = L(1/2 − r) elements, choosing s v < C min , we can see that the probability for successful forging decays exponentially,
In particular, one can show that the optimal measurement that Bob can perform is to measure either in the {|0 , |1 } or in the {|+ , |− } basis, either by checking the Helstrom conditions [20] or using the results of [10] for minimum-cost measurements of symmetric states. This leads to C min = 1/8. Intuitively, when Bob chooses to measure in the basis which includes the element Alice sent, which happens with probability 1/2, he obtains the correct answer. When Bob chooses the wrong basis, which happens with probability 1/2, his causes a mismatch with probability 1/4 and thus the overall probability that Bob causes a mismatch is 1/8. For coherent attacks, while intuitively similar arguments should hold, the actual proof is left for future work. Note that security against coherent forging attacks is an important open question in previous QDS schemes as well.
Security of protocol P2
We will first show for protocol P2 that the probability for repudiation decreases exponentially with the length L and then do the same for the forging probability.
a. Security against repudiation
In order to repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message while Charlie rejects it. Since Bob has to accept the message, Alice's declaration must agree with all the elements of P rivKeyB m . On the other hand, for Charlie to reject the message, he needs to detect at least s v L mistakes. These should all come from P rivKeyC m . Coming back to the requirement that Bob has to accept the message, we see that none of the elements that Bob receives from Charlie should include a mismatch. Since Charlie sends each bit of his P rivKeyC m to Bob with probability 1/2, then if there are R mismatches in P rivKeyC m , the probability for Bob to see no mismatches is (1/2) R . It is also clear that the best strategy for Alice is to send exactly R = s v L mismatches to Charlie, and this leads to Alice's optimum repudiation probability p(rep) ≤ (1/2) svL (A8) which decays exponentially as the length of the signature L increases.
b. Security against forging
Bob, in order to forge, must give a declaration that has fewer than s v L mismatches. Note that this protocol is essentially classical, so if Alice sends a bit that does not agree with her future declaration, then the recipient detects the mismatch deterministically. If Charlie sends more than L(1/2 + r) bits of his private key to Bob, then the protocol is aborted by step 4 of the distribution stage. We assume the worst-case scenario (for the honest participants, Charlie and Alice) that Charlie has sent exactly L(1/2 + r) elements of his private key to Bob. This means that Bob must guess the remaining K = L(1/2 − r) bits in P rivKeyC m , making fewer than s v L mistakes. The expected probability of error for a single guess is 1/2. The empirical mean number of wrong guessesX needs to be less than s v L/K (in other words, Bob should make fewer than s v L mistakes among the K elements he is required to guess). This, using Hoeffding's inequalities [19] , implies that the probability to forge is bounded by
which, provided that s v < 1/4 − r/2, decays exponentially as L increases. Since typically r will be chosen to be small, this condition agrees with the intuitive picture. A forger will on average guess half of the elements correctly, so he would typically make O(L/4) mistakes. Therefore, choosing s v smaller than 1/4 guarantees the security. Finally, it is important to note, that unlike in protocol P1 and its variants, in protocol P2 Alice sends different signatures to Bob and Charlie. If Alice was to send the same signature to Bob and Charlie, and they are aware of this, then forging would be possible.
